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This thesis is built with two essays on payments for ecosystem services under 
different objectives. The purpose of the first essay is identifying optimal spatial targets 
for PES under the multiple objectives of maximizing cost efficiency of ecological 
benefits, represented by per unit cost of the ecological benefit, and maximizing economic 
impacts, represented by gross domestic product (GDP). A further purpose is to evaluate 
the tradeoff between the two objectives. In our case study, the two objectives of a PES 
program are to maximize the cost efficiency of forest carbon storage and to maximize the 
program’s economic impacts. Multi-objective linear programming (MOLP), an 
optimization tool, was chosen to incorporate these objectives as targeting criteria. Results 
identifying targeted counties with optimal PES distributions will help conservation 
agencies anticipate regional (i.e., county-level) budget allocations dependent on the 
relative importance placed on the two objectives. Similarly, projections of regional forest 
carbon storage and economic impacts from the optimal distributions of payments will 
help conservation agencies anticipate regional heterogeneity in forest carbon storage and 
economic impacts and access their tradeoffs. 
The second essay is for identifying spatial targets that optimally allocate a given 
budget to achieve the multiple objectives of improving cost efficiency and promoting 
equity and economic development. We evaluate trade-off and synergistic relationships 
among the three objectives. Our results will help conservation agencies understand how 
optimal spatial targeting and optimal budget allocations change with different weighting 
schemes. Specifically, conservation agencies can optimally target and allocate budgets to 
counties based on their preferences among the different weighting scenarios with regard 
 
v 
to the trade-offs and synergies among the objectives of improving the cost efficiency of 
carbon storage, decreasing poverty, and increasing economic impact of PES. The case 
study area in our two essay covers the part of Central and Southern Appalachian Region 
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The global temperature, on average, increased between 0.6 and 0.9 degrees 
Celsius over the 1906-2005 period. The rate of increase almost doubled during the last 
half decade of that period (IPCC 2007). Recent climate change has triggered extensive, 
negative effects on natural and human systems, including loss and damage to ecosystems 
and environmental resources (IPCC 2014). Carbon dioxide that comprises the majority of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is one of the major contributing factors to the 
observed increase in global temperatures since the mid-20th century (IPCC 2014; Garnett 
2008). As global concern mounts around the issue of climate change, increasing and 
sustaining forest-based carbon sequestration has proven to be a cost-effective way of 
mitigating atmospheric carbon (Dwyer et al. 1992) 
Despite the vital role of carbon sequestration in mitigating climate change, most 
forestland owners receive no compensation for their contributions to this service. 
Incentive payments to forest landowners can internalize the positive externality of carbon 
sequestration (Engel et al. 2008; Wünscher et al. 2008; Farley and Costanza 2010). 
Payment systems for ecosystem services (PES), like forest-based carbon sequestration, 
have received considerable attention recently as a policy tool to internalize the value of 
ecosystem services into land-use decision making (Engel et al. 2008; Farley and Costanza 
2010) 
The use of PES is often viewed as a means to achieve conservation goals while 
promoting social equity and rural economic development (Bremer et al. 2014). However, 
the potential inclusion of forest carbon in the U.S. carbon market program is 
controversial, due in no small part to uncomfortably high levels of uncertainty in terms of 
cost efficiency and potential economic impacts of payments for ecosystem services 
 
3 
(PES). Specifically, asymmetric information with regard to opportunity costs makes it 
difficult to structure payments capable of differentiating between lands that differ in 
terms of carbon sequestration opportunity costs and/or landowner willingness-to-accept 
(WTA) payment to either afforest or refrain from deforesting their land. Likewise, 
relevant social welfare analyses raise questions about the positive economic impacts of 
PES since the mechanism involves the government taking wealth away from taxpayers 
and redistributing it to forest landowners, creating the potential for deadweight loss (Wu 
and Babcock 1995). 
Therefore, there are several studies addressing cost efficiency emphasizes the 
integration of costs and benefits in PES targeting criteria (Barton et al. 2003; Ferraro 
2004; Claassen et al. 2008) and finding that low-income rural households and 
communities can potentially benefit from PES programs, but program success depends on 
factors such as local conditions, the distribution of land and land quality, economic 
accounting of ecosystem services, and the use of appropriate spatial targeting (Pagiola et 
al. 2005; Zilberman et al. 2008; Hyberg et al. 1991; Grêt-Regamey and Kytzia 2007; 
Milder et al. 2010). Also, the studies focusing on the balance among cost efficiency, 
social equity, and rural economic development has evolved to help design PES that 
achieve conservation goals while promoting social equity and rural economic 
development.  
In response to issue around PES, the first essay focuses on identifying optimal 
spatial targets for PES under the multiple objectives of maximizing cost efficiency of 
ecological benefits, represented by per unit cost of ecological benefit, and maximizing 
economic impacts, represented by gross domestic product (GDP). A further purpose is to 
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evaluate the tradeoff between the two objectives. Along the same line with the first essay, 
the second essay is dealing with identifying spatial targets that optimally allocate a given 
budget to achieve the multiple objectives of improving cost efficiency and promoting 
equity and economic development. Then, we evaluate trade-off and synergistic 
relationships among the three objectives. With the result from two essays will help 
conservation agency anticipate budget allocations dependent on the relative importance 
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We identify optimal spatial targets for payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
under the multiple objectives of maximizing forest carbon storage cost efficiency and 
maximizing economic impacts. A further purpose is to evaluate the tradeoff between the 
two objectives. These objectives are used as targeting criteria in our case study of the 
Central and Southern Appalachian Region of the United States, a heavily forested, low-
income region that could benefit from the economic impacts from PES. The concave 
shaped Pareto optimal frontiers provide evidence that the increase in economic impacts is 
relatively higher than the sacrifice in forest carbon benefits when the initial weight 
assigned to economic impacts is relatively lower than the initial weight assigned to forest 
carbon benefits and vice versa. Our projections of county-level forest carbon storage and 
economic impacts help conservation agencies anticipate regional heterogeneity in forest 






1.1. Background and objective 
The global temperature, on average, increased between 0.6 and 0.9 degrees 
Celsius over the 1906-2005 period. The rate of increase almost doubled during the last 
half decade of that period (IPCC 2007). Recent climate change has triggered extensive, 
negative effects on natural and human systems, including loss and damage to ecosystems 
and environmental resources (IPCC 2014). Carbon dioxide that comprises the majority of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is one of the major contributing factors to the 
observed increase in global temperatures since the mid-20th century (Garnett 2008; IPCC 
2014). In response, worldwide attempts to mitigate atmospheric carbon emissions have 
been made (Dodman 2009). Among those efforts, considerable attention has focused on 
promoting forest carbon sequestration to offset carbon emissions by reducing 
deforestation and increasing afforestation (Wittman and Caron 2009; Latta et al. 2011; 
Cho et al. 2017). These efforts are important, because global forestland has the capacity 
to sequester 2.4 ± 0.4 peta-grams of carbon emissions annually, which is equivalent to 
30% of global carbon emissions from fossil fuels used in 2008 (Le Quéré et al. 2009; Pan 
et al. 2011).  
Despite the vital role of carbon sequestration in mitigating climate change, most 
forestland owners receive no compensation for their contributions to this service. 
Incentive payments to forest landowners can internalize the positive externality of carbon 
sequestration (Engel et al. 2008; Wünscher et al. 2008; Farley and Costanza 2010) while 
providing potential economic impacts to rural communities (Miranda et al. 2003; Corbera 
et al. 2009; Li et al. 2011). The proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act would 
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have included a cap-and-trade program to generate payments for forest landowners for 
the carbon sequestered in their forests (USDS 2010). That said, the potential inclusion of 
forest carbon in the U.S. carbon market program is controversial, due in no small part to 
uncomfortably high levels of uncertainty in terms of cost efficiency and potential 
economic impacts of payments for ecosystem services (PES). Specifically, asymmetric 
information with regard to opportunity costs makes it difficult to structure payments 
capable of differentiating between lands that differ in terms of carbon sequestration 
opportunity costs and/or landowner willingness-to-accept (WTA) payment to either 
afforest or refrain from deforesting their land. Likewise, relevant social welfare analyses 
raise questions about the positive economic impacts of PES since the mechanism 
involves the government taking wealth away from taxpayers and redistributing it to forest 
landowners, creating the potential for deadweight loss (Wu and Babcock 1995).  
Two branches of literature on PES have been developed to address these 
difficulties: one dealing with PES cost efficiency and the other dealing with the economic 
impacts of PES programs. The literature addressing cost efficiency emphasizes the 
integration of costs and benefits in PES targeting criteria (Barton et al. 2003; Ferraro 
2004; Claassen et al. 2008). The other branch of literature finds that low-income rural 
households and communities can potentially benefit from PES programs, but program 
success depends on factors such as local conditions, the distribution of land and land 
quality, economic accounting of ecosystem services, and the use of appropriate spatial 
targeting (Hyberg et al. 1991; Pagiola et al. 2005; Grêt-Regamey and Kytzia 2007; 
Zilberman et al. 2008; Milder et al. 2010).  
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Despite the important role of cost efficiency in achieving given levels of 
ecological benefits and the need to receive positive economic impacts from successfully 
developed PES programs, few, if any, studies integrate these objectives into PES 
targeting criteria. This gap in the literature is surprising given that (1) PES often serve 
multiple objectives, including the promotion of efficient conservation and positive 
economic impacts (Bulte et al. 2008; McShane et al. 2011; Sims et al. 2014) and (2) an 
understanding of the tradeoffs between these objectives is important for successful PES 
design (Wu and Yu 2017). 
The purpose of this research is to fill a gap in the literature by identifying optimal 
spatial targets for PES under the multiple objectives of maximizing cost efficiency of 
ecological benefits, represented by per unit cost of ecological benefit, and maximizing 
economic impacts, represented by gross domestic product (GDP). A further purpose is to 
evaluate the tradeoff between the two objectives. In our case study, the two objectives of 
a PES program are to maximize the cost efficiency of forest carbon storage and to 
maximize the program’s economic impacts. Multi-objective linear programming 
(MOLP), an optimization tool (Savir 1966), was chosen to incorporate these objectives as 
targeting criteria in our case study of the Central and Southern Appalachian Region of the 
United States (see Figure 2.1.).  
The study area is a significant carbon sink accounting for around 20% of the 
forested area in the U.S. and is also in need of an economic stimulus since it is one of the 
most concentrated areas of poverty in the U.S. (Smith et al. 2009; Carl Vinson Institute of 
Government 2002). Recent, continental-scale carbon budget analyses based on multiple 
scaling approaches suggest that the region is becoming increasingly important as a 
 
13 
significant carbon sink (Hayes et al. 2012). Further, the average poverty rate of the region 
was around 24% from 1960-2000, while the national average during the same period was 
around 14% (Deaton and Niman 2012) 
Through MOLP, we identify optimal county-level targets with a total 
conservation budget optimally distributed under 27 alternatives, nine weighting scenarios 
involving the two core objectives multiplied by three budget scenarios, and identify 
resulting changes in forest carbon and estimate economic impacts. We then develop three 
tradeoff frontiers between the two objectives that are created from the targeted PES for 
the three budget scenarios. Along each frontier, PES is Pareto optimal since forest carbon 
storage cannot be increased without sacrificing economic impacts and vice versa.  
Results identifying targeted countie s with optimal PES distributions will help 
conservation agencies anticipate regional (i.e., county-level) budget allocations dependent 
on the relative importance placed on the two objectives. Similarly, projections of regional 
forest carbon storage and economic impacts from the optimal distributions of payments 
will help conservation agencies anticipate regional heterogeneity in forest carbon storage 
and economic impacts and access their tradeoffs. The regional heterogeneity in the 
anticipated effects of the benefits and their tradeoffs can serve as an empirically-informed 
knowledge base for conservation agencies to use in evaluating forest-based carbon 
incentive payment programs that balance the objectives of providing forest carbon 






1.2. Literature review 
In literature concerned with targeting criteria for conservation programs, benefits, 
costs, and benefit-cost ratios are used as targeting criteria (Babcock et al. 1997). In the 
benefit-targeting approach, high-benefit target areas are identified based on differences in 
the benefits between protected and unprotected lands (Scott et al. 1993; Wright et al. 
1994; Powell et al. 2000; Rodrigues et al. 2003). Under this targeting approach, the costs 
of establishing protected areas are implicitly assumed to be equal. In reality, substantial 
cost variation exists between potential protected areas, suggesting the need to integrate 
establishment costs and benefits when selecting areas to target for protection (Ando et al. 
1998; Balmford et al. 2000; Polasky et al. 2001; Ferraro 2003; Moore et al. 2004).  
A branch of literature focuses on whether the correlation between costs and 
benefits has implications for the cost efficiency of protection. Babcock et al. (1997) 
analyzed how the joint spatial distribution of costs and benefits influences the cost 
efficiency of different targeting rules. Ferraro (2003) examined the correlation between 
benefit ranking and cost ranking to identify conditions under which the integration of cost 
and benefit information is likely important for effective decision making. Chomitz et al. 
(2006) evaluated cost-targeting criteria by examining the effect of correlation between 
costs and biodiversity for a targeting rule that includes a low-cost solution. Ando et al. 
(1998) examined the effect of heterogeneous costs and corresponding biodiversity on 
efficient conservation. Polasky et al. (2001) investigated the relation between a 
conservation budget and biological reserves and concluded that an integrated analysis of 
biological costs and benefits is needed to make effective conservation decisions. 
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A large set of literature focuses on improving the cost efficiency of PES through 
the cost-benefit relationship (Antle et al. 2003; Barton et al. 2003; Ferraro 2004; 
Lubowski et al. 2006; Claassen et al. 2008; Engel et al. 2008; Gibbons et al. 2011; Lewis 
et al. 2011; Mason and Plantinga 2011; Armsworth et al. 2012; Hanley et al. 2012; 
Polasky et al. 2014). The literature suggests that increases in cost efficiency are achieved 
when more finely resolved spatial variations in costs and benefits are used to allocate 
PES contracts and set payment rates (Babcock et al. 1996; Antle et al. 2003; Zhao et al. 
2003; Mason and Plantinga 2011; Armsworth et al. 2012). Recent literature suggests that 
contract length and timing have clear implications for the cost efficiency of PES and 
other conservation programs (Ando and Chen 2011; Lennox and Armsworth 2011; 
Curran et al. 2016; Schöttker et al. 2016; Drechsler et al. 2017).   
In addition, PES programs have become a flagship approach for conservation 
organizations to advance rural economic development and reduce poverty (Zilberman et 
al. 2008). The financial transfers of PES allow landowners to internalize the positive 
externalities associated with ecosystem services (Grieg-Gran et al. 2005) and, thus, PES 
programs are a potential tool for generating positive regional economic impacts for 
participating landowners (Engel et al. 2008; Zilberman et al. 2008; Zhang and Pagiola 
2011). Developing countries have begun to incorporate PES into rural economic 
development programs (Muradian et al. 2010), and the literature has started to focus on 
understanding the economic impacts of PES (Engel et al. 2008; Zilberman et al. 2008; 
Zhang and Pagiola 2011). Findings in the literature include the following: 1) PES can be 
vital for poverty reduction and rural economic development if designed to fit local 
conditions (Pagiola et al. 2005), 2) the spatial distribution of land and land quality are 
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essential in determining poverty impacts (Zilberman et al. 2008), 3) the economic 
impacts of PES depend on how effectively the program reaches the targeted beneficiaries 
(Hyberg et al. 1991; Milder et al. 2010), 4) and the date when the program starts is crucial 
for successful impacts on economic development and poverty reduction (Randrianarison 
et al. 2017).  
Few studies consider the economic impacts of PES when using the cost efficiency 
of ecological benefits as the targeting criterion (Pagiola et al. 2005; Milder et al. 2010; 
Ingram et al. 2014). When estimating the economic impacts of PES, the cost efficiency of 
ecological benefits is typically ignored. In contrast, a few studies examined the tradeoffs 
between cost efficiency and distributional equity in analyzing the performance of PES 
(Alix-Garcia et al. 2003; Wu and Yu 2017). A major challenge in developing a 
framework that considers both criteria in the spatial targeting of PES involves estimating 
the values of ecological and economic impacts for given payment distributions. 
Specifically, since payment distributions are critical elements for multi-objective 




In our case study, we employ a framework that estimates forest carbon storage 
and economic impacts using optimal payment distributions for multiple scenarios with 
different weights between the two objectives. First, we estimate potential maximum 
forest carbon benefits available for each county in response to alternative PES. This 
potential carbon benefit is found by estimating the opportunity cost of sequestering forest 
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carbon using a land-use model that links forest-based carbon payments to forestland 
change. We then convert forestland changes to forest carbon storage through a carbon 
simulation model. The maximum county-level economic impacts, represented by GDP, 
for given payment amounts are estimated using Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) 
via analyzing the interdependence of 536 industries based on the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) throughout the regional economies (AIM-AG 
2017). The estimates acquired from the land-use, carbon simulation, and IMPLAN 
models become inputs for the MOLP model to identify a set of optimal target counties 
with an optimal budget distribution given different weights between the two objectives 
and total PES budgets. The results from the integrated empirical framework are used to 
develop their Pareto optimal frontiers. 
 
2.1. Land-use model 
 We adopt the conceptual framework developed in earlier works (Capozza and 
Helsley 1989; Parks and Murray 1994; Barbier and Burgess 1997; Mauldin et al. 1999; 
Plantinga et al. 1999; Lubowski et al. 2006; Lubowski et al. 2008) to specify a land use 
model. The model assumes a risk-neutral, utility-maximizing, price-taking landowner 
who maximizes expected net-present return from the decision to convert forestland to an 
alternative use or retain forestland for a given time period. Under this conceptual 
framework, land is retained as forest as long as the discounted marginal net benefit from 
forestland exceeds the discounted marginal net benefit from competing land uses. Given 
the conceptual framework, retaining forestland, given a time period, is expected to 
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increase as the discounted marginal net benefit from forestland relative to the discounted 
marginal net benefit from competing land uses increases.  
In our study, we hypothesize that forested area at the end of a period relative to 
forested area at the beginning of the period is a function of annual forest return relative to 
annual returns from competing land uses (i.e., crop, pasture, and urban) at the beginning 




� = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀                      (1)  
where 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 and 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 are, respectively, forested areas in the first and last years of two five-
year periods (i.e., 2001-2006 and 2006-2011); 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢  are the first year’s forest returns 
relative to the returns from crop, pasture, and urban land uses, respectively, estimated by 
subtracting returns from competing land uses from forest return; 𝑋𝑋 includes other factors 
that affect 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
 (referred to as “ratio of forested area”); 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝, 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢, and 𝑋𝑋 are 
corresponding parameters; and 𝜀𝜀 is an error term. County-average slope and elevation are 
included in 𝑋𝑋 to control for the effects of topographical characteristics. The time-period 
dummy variable (i.e., 1 for observation in 2001-2006 and 0 otherwise) is included in 𝑋𝑋 to 
capture temporal differences in the ratios of forested area that are not captured by the 
difference in relative returns across time. Ecoregion dummy variables and state dummy 
variables are included in 𝑋𝑋 to capture regional fixed effects, such as differences in land-
use change patterns and land-use policies across ecoregions and states.  
Forested areas at the county level are estimated by aggregating 30-m resolution 
land cover data from National Land Cover Database (NLCD 2011). The annual forest 
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return at the county level is estimated based on Faustmann’s model (1849) using harvest 
volume data from the Forest Inventory and Analysis database (USDA Forest Service 
2017) and stumpage price data from Timber Mart-South (2006, 2011). The annual return 
of cropland is estimated based on county-level net cash farm income from cropland and 
areas of harvest cropland from USDA Census of Agriculture (2012) and National 
Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS 2014). The annual return from pastureland is 
estimated using county-level pastureland rent, county-level cattle numbers, and county-
level pastureland area from National Agricultural Statistics Service (2014) and USDA 
Census of Agriculture (2012). The annual return from urban land is estimated based on 
parcel-level data for assessed land value and total assessed value from the tax assessors’ 
offices of 25 counties and census-block group data for median housing price (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2000; American Community Survey 2009, 2012). See S.1.of the online 
supplementary material or Cho et al. (2017) for a detailed description of how the four net 
returns are calculated. The Zonal Statistics tool in ArcGIS 10.1 (ESRI 2012) and a Digital 
Elevation Model (DEM) (U.S. Geological Survey 2013) are used to estimate county-
average slope and elevation. See Table 2.1. for a detailed description of the variables.  
Once the land-use model in equation (1) was estimated, we calculated the 
marginal effects of forest return relative to returns from competing land uses (i.e., crop, 
pasture, and urban) on the ratio of forested area for each period. Only the marginal effect 
of the forest return relative to the return from urban use was significant at the 5% level 
(hereafter referred to as “significant”) in our land-use model, and thus we simulated 
changes in the ratio of forested area by incrementally increasing forest return relative to 
urban return, holding urban return constant. This simulation implies that all forestland 
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owners receive the same payment amount if they are in the same county and that 
payments made at the county level are to discourage deforestation for urbanization.  
The simulation is implemented under the assumption that the bid amount by 
conservation agencies converges to equilibrium, where the bid equals landowners’ 
opportunity costs of providing forest-based carbon storage. As a result, asymmetric 
information in opportunity costs between landowners and conservation agencies seeking 
to purchase the ecosystem services is overcome (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
Hamsvoort 1997; Stoneham et al. 2003; Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann 2007). We make 
such an assumption since a portion of landowners may end up receiving payments 
equaling more than their opportunity costs, should overbidding be allowed without 
resolving the asymmetry (Ferraro 2008; Persson and Alpízar 2013) 
 .  
2.2. Carbon simulation model 
The Terrestrial Ecosystem Model (TEM) is used to estimate changes in carbon 
storage corresponding to changes in the ratio of forested area for each period based on 
climate, forest type, disturbance and management histories, and other environmental 
characteristics (Hayes et al. 2011). The TEM enables us to simulate cohort-level monthly 
carbon fluxes for a period for each of the four land-use categories (crop, pasture, urban, 
and forest). The simulated carbon fluxes are used to estimate carbon storage in forestland 
and urban land. The estimated changes in carbon storage at the cohort level, based on the 
area of each contiguous vegetation type, are used to aggregate changes in carbon storage 
to the county level. For each period, this is done by simulating changes in the ratio of 
forested area as forest return is incrementally increased relative to return from urban use. 
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2.3. Impact analysis for planning 
IMPLAN (Version 3.0) utilizes a National Trade Flows Model (NTFM) (doubly-
constrained gravity model) to estimate a new set of regional purchase coefficients and 
trade data to estimate local purchases based on a region’s characteristics (Lindall et al. 
2006). IMPLAN output includes descriptive measures of the economy including total 
industry output (a measure of economic activity), employment, labor income, and total 
value-added or gross domestic product (GDP). Total industry output is defined as the 
value of production by industry per year or a measure of overall economic activity by the 
industry. Employment represents total wage and salary employees, as well as self-
employed jobs in a region, for both full-time and part-time workers. Labor income is 
defined as employee compensation, including benefits, and proprietary (owner-operator) 
income. Total value added, or GDP is defined as all income to workers paid by 
employers; self-employed income; interests; rents, royalties, dividends, and profit 
payments; and excise and sales taxes paid by individuals to businesses. Not only does the 
model describe a regional economy, it can be used for predictive purposes by providing 
multiplier-based estimates. From the economic impact indicators generated by IMPLAN, 
GDP was selected to represent economic impacts for our study. It is considered the most 
proper instrument for estimating regional overall economic impact (Weisbrod and 
Weisbrod 1997). 
 Multipliers measure the response of the economy to a change in production or 
demand.  Multiplier analysis generally focuses on the impacts of exogenous changes on:  
a) output of the sectors in the economy, b) income earned by households because of new 
outputs, and c) employment (in physical terms) that is expected to be generated because 
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of the new outputs. The concept of multipliers rests on the difference between the initial 
impact of an exogenous change (final demand) and the total impacts of a change. Direct 
impacts measure the response of a given industry given a change in final demand for that 
same industry. Indirect impacts represent the response by all local industries that occur as 
a result of a change in final demand for a specific industry. Induced impacts represent the 
response by all local industries caused by increased (or decreased) expenditures of new 
household income and inter-institutional transfers generated (or loss) from the direct and 
indirect impacts of the change in final demand for a specific industry. Direct, indirect and 
induced impact were integrated as economic impact in our model 
We used Type SAM (Social Accounting Matrix) multipliers in our model. Type 
SAM multipliers are used to estimate induced impacts and are calculated as (direct + 
indirect + induced impacts)/direct impacts. The Type SAM multipliers take into account 
the expenditures resulting from increased incomes of households from payment as well as 
inter-institutional transfers resulting from economic activity. Therefore, Type SAM 
multipliers assume that as final demand changes, incomes also increase along with inter-
institutional transfers. As consumers and institutions increase expenditures, this leads to 
increased demands for local industries. 
 
2.4. Multi-objective linear programming 
 The multiple objectives of maximizing both forest carbon benefits and economic 
impacts triggered by payments are the targeting criteria we use in MOLP. Following 
Ragsdale (2014), the MINIMAX method, which searches for optimal solutions with 
minimal deviation from the target value for each objective, is utilized to determine 
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optimal target counties in two steps. The first step determines the optimal objective 
values of each individual objective, i.e. maximum forest carbon storage 𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐 and maximum 
economic impacts 𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒 as: 
  𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑋𝑋𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐
( ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  )𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  subject to ∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵,     
𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑋𝑋𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒
( ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 )𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  subject to ∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵,                    (2)  
where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 are total forest carbon storage and total economic impact for county i; 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 
and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 are the optimal decision variables (continuous numbers between 0 as the lower 
bound and 1 as the upper bound) representing the share for county i that is optimal for the 
respective objectives; 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is the total payment that is needed to obtain the total forest 
carbon storage at county i; and B is the government’s budget for one of three budget 
scenarios (i.e., 75%, 50%, and 25% of budget needed to reach maximum carbon storage 
capacity).  
Using the optimal values of the two individual objectives from the first step, the 
second set of optimal decision variables 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 (continuous numbers between 0 as the lower 
bound and 1 as the upper bound) for county i that minimizes the largest weighted 
deviation from the optimal values of the two objectives (𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐 and 𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒), with two constraints 
simultaneously is estimated as: 
   Min Q  
subject to 




𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 ∗ (𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒 −  ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ∗
1
𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒
≤ Q     (3) 
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where 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐, is a hypothetical weight for forest carbon storage and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 is a hypothetical 
weight associated with economic impact. Nine weight combinations between the two 
objectives (i.e., 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐-100% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒-0%, 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐-87.5% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒-12.5%, 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐-75% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒-25%, 
𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐-62.5% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒-37.5%, 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐-50% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒-50%, 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐-37.5% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒-62.5%, 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐-25% and 
𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒-75%, 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐-12.5% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒-87.5%, and 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐-0% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒-100%) are used to reflect relative 
importance between the two objectives. Once the optimal decision variable 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is obtained, 
it is considered as the proportion of area that is included in PES from the maximum 
candidate area in the county i. The budget allocated to the county i is estimated by 
multiplying the proportion of the county, the optimal decision variable 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, by maximum 
payment 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖. To solve the MOLP, the fminimax function in Matlab (MathWorks 2017) is 
used with necessary modification of the code.  
   
3. Empirical results and discussion 
 Table 2.2. reports coefficients and corresponding standard errors for the semi-log 
model in equation (1). The goodness of fit of the model is reflected in an adjusted R2 of 
0.174, suggesting that the explanatory variables explain 17.4% of the variation of the 
ratio of forested area. The F-statistic value is equal to 8.12 and statistically significant at 
the 5% level, suggesting that overall estimation of the model is significant.  
Forest return relative to urban return is positive and significant, while the other 
two relative returns are insignificant. Thus, the results suggest that forest return affects 
the ratio of forested area only if it is valued relative to urban return. Specifically, an 
increase of $1/hectare/year in forest return relative to urban return in the first year 
increases the average ratio of forested area by 0.0006% during the two periods. This 
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finding suggests that incentive payments to boost forest return work towards sustaining 
and/or increasing forestland only if the competing land use is urban development, not 
crop or pasture management.  
 The dummy variables associated with the Cumberlands & Southern Ridge and 
Valley Ecoregion and the 2001-2006 time period are significant while state dummy 
variables are not significant. The signs of the coefficients imply that (1) the ratio of 
forested area decreases more in the Cumberlands & Southern Ridge and Valley 
Ecoregion than in the Southern Blue Ridge Ecoregion on average, (2) the ratio of forested 
area decreases more during the 2006-2011 period relative to the 2001-2006 period on 
average, and (3) the change of the ratio of forest area is not significantly affected by state 
boundaries. These two findings suggest that loss of forestland differs across ecoregions 
and time.   
Figure 2.2. illustrates simulated forested area for the entire study area that would 
have been discouraged from urban development at different values of forest return 
relative to urban return. The simulated prevention of deforested area increases at a 
decreasing rate until it reaches 60,216 hectares with a budget of $1,541,578 (Figure 2.2.). 
The spatial distribution of the maximum allocated budget across counties is shown in 
Figure 2.3. This figure illustrates how the payment budget would have been allocated if 
its distribution were based on how much forested area would have been discouraged from 
urban development without the optimal spatial targeting of payments.  
 Figure 2.4. illustrates the spatial distribution of carbon-cost efficiency across 
counties. The distribution ranges from 0.01 tonne/$ to 1.97 tonne/$ when the payment 
budget is not constrained. Carbon-cost efficiency is higher at the border area between 
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West Virginia and Virginia, southwest Pennsylvania, southwest North Carolina, and the 
southern tip of Appalachia in Alabama. Counties in the highest carbon-cost efficiency 
range (0.68–1.97 tonne/$) tend to have (1) higher carbon storage gains from preventing 
deforestation (1.85 tonne/hectare higher than the average carbon storage gain of 4.26 
tonne/hectare for the entire study area) and (2) relatively lower opportunity costs of 
preventing deforestation ($86.35/hectare lower than the average opportunity cost of 
$93.03/hectare).   
  Figure 2.5. illustrates the spatial distribution across counties of economic-cost 
efficiency (total county value added divided by the county’s maximum allocated budget). 
Economic-cost efficiency is higher in a cluster of counties in Pennsylvania and in other 
counties dispersed within the rest of the study area. The counties in the highest economic-
cost efficiency range ($1.75–$2.00) tend to have higher regional purchase coefficients, 
the proportion of each dollar of local demand for a given commodity that is purchased 
from local producers (IMPLAN Group LLC 2017).  
 Table 2.3. shows total carbon storage, gross domestic product, carbon-cost 
efficiency, and economic-cost efficiency for the nine objective weighting scenarios 
calculated for each budget scenario. On average, economic-cost efficiency is higher when 
more weight is placed on maximizing economic impacts compared to maximizing 
carbon-cost efficiency, while carbon-cost efficiency is higher when more weight is 
assigned to maximizing carbon-cost efficiency. Figure 2.6. illustrates the payment budget 
distribution among counties for the nine weighting scenarios when the annual-payment 
budget is 50% of the budget required to achieve maximum carbon storage capacity. This 
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budget constraint is used in Figure 2.6. since the budget level has little effect on the 
overall pattern of the weighted distributions. 
The maps in Figure 2.6. can be characterized by three points. First, the greater the 
weight assigned to maximizing forest carbon storage relative to maximizing economic 
impacts, the more the optimal budget allocation is dispersed among the counties. For 
example, if a weight of 100% were assigned to maximizing the forest carbon benefit, the 
total budget would be distributed optimally to 202 of the 288 counties. Most (64 counties) 
of the 86 counties not receiving payments lost no forestland over the two periods. The 
number of optimally targeted counties gradually declines as the weight assigned to 
maximizing forest carbon benefits declines and the weight assigned to maximizing 
economic impacts increases. When a weight of 100% is assigned to maximizing 
economic impacts, the number of optimally targeted counties falls to 72. This discovery 
results from a greater dispersion of economic impacts among counties relative to carbon 
benefits (Figure 2.7.). Specifically, the coefficient of variation of economic impacts with 
the maximum allocated budget is 3.50. For carbon benefits, the coefficient of variation is 
2.50. Results from a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Massey 1951) indicate that 
the distribution of economic impacts stochastically dominates the distribution of carbon 
benefits (p-value < 0.05). 
Second, under all weighting scenarios, consistently higher optimal budgets occur 
in the counties of southern Appalachia (i.e. Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee and North 
Carolina) and the southeastern end of Pennsylvania. The counties with optimal budget 
allocations in the upper quartile in Figure 2.6. tend to have high economic-cost 
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efficiencies regardless of the weight assigned for that objective. This finding implies that 
economic-cost efficiency is important in allocating the optimal budget. 
Third, assuming 50% of the maximum budget, 65 of 288 counties are consistently 
chosen for optimal spatial targeting regardless of the weighting scenario. Of those 
counties, 59 counties are among the top 65 counties ranked by highest economic-cost 
efficiency, while only 21 counties are among the top 65 counties ranked by highest 
carbon-cost efficiency. These findings suggest that economic-cost efficiency is a 
relatively more dominant objective in the targeting decision than the objective of carbon-
cost efficiency. Again, this pattern of optimization is likely related to a greater dispersion 
of economic-cost efficiency relative to carbon-cost efficiency.  
Figure 2.8. illustrates three carbon-economic impact frontiers that reflect different 
tradeoffs between forest carbon storage and economic impacts, given different weights 
imposed between the two objectives for each budget scenario. For example, given a 
weight of 100% assigned to maximizing forest carbon benefits at point A on the 50%-
budget frontier (i.e., 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 = 100% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 = 0%), the optimal budget distribution among 
counties yields 296,215 tonnes of carbon storage and $1,360,551 of economic impacts 
(see Table 2.3.). Reducing the weight on maximizing forest carbon storage to 87.5% and 
increasing the weight on maximizing economic impacts to 12.5% (i.e., 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 = 87.5% and 
𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 = 12.5%) at point B on the 50%-budget frontier, the optimal budget distribution yields 
295,802 tonnes of carbon storage and $1,367,666 in economic impacts (see Table 2.3.). 
The move from point A to point B implies that economic impacts increase by $7,115 with 
a sacrifice of 413 tonnes of carbon storage, yielding a tradeoff ratio of 0.058 tonnes/$. 
This tradeoff ratio suggests a sacrifice of 0.058 tonnes of forest carbon storage for a 
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conservation agency wanting to achieve an additional $1 of economic impact. This 
tradeoff ratio increases (or the amount of forest carbon storage forgone increases for an 
additional $1 of economic impact) as the weight assigned to maximizing economic 
impacts increases (e.g., tradeoff ratio of 6.566 tonnes/$ from the move of point C for the 
scenario of 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐-12.5% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒-87.5% to point D for the scenario of 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐-0% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒-
100%). This concave relationship between optimal carbon benefits and economic impacts 
is consistent for the three budget scenarios and values for both objectives consistently 
decrease with tighter budget scenarios.  
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 There is clear evidence suggesting that PES can serve the multiple objectives of 
promoting efficient ecosystem services and providing positive economic impacts 
(Miranda et al. 2003; Bulte et al. 2008; Sims et al. 2014). Nevertheless, PES targeting 
criteria have mostly focused on promoting efficient conservation without concern for 
providing positive economic impacts (Babcock et al. 1997; Ando et al. 1998; Barton et al. 
2003; Ferraro 2004). Research is lacking on PES programs that serve both objectives. 
Thus, it is critically important to understand optimal spatial PES targets and the tradeoffs 
between the two objectives.   
 We developed an integrated empirical framework for identifying optimal spatial 
PES targets with optimal payment budget distributions with tradeoffs between ecological 
and economic impacts. Our case study deals with the two objectives of maximizing forest 
carbon sequestration and the economic impact of PES at the county level in the Central 
and Southern Appalachian Region of the United States. We evaluated the implications of 
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different weighting scenarios between the two objectives for county-level optimal budget 
distributions. In addition, we developed Pareto optimal frontiers under alternative total 
budget constraints that assumed the given total budget could not be reallocated among 
counties without sacrificing one objective for the other. 
Maps of PES optimal budget distributions among counties, given different 
weighting scenarios, provide evidence that, the greater the weight assigned to maximizing 
forest carbon benefits relative to maximizing economic impacts, the more widespread the 
optimal budget is allocated among the counties. This finding occurs since the economic-
impact objective is more dominant in the targeting decision than the carbon-cost 
efficiency objective, on average. This evidence suggests that incorporating economic 
impacts in the targeting criteria, along with promoting cost-efficient conservation, is a 
viable option. Our projections of county-level forest carbon storage and economic 
impacts, given different weighting scenarios, help target optimal county-level PES budget 
distributions and evaluate their effects on both objectives. 
The Pareto optimal frontiers provide evidence that the optimal relationship 
between forest carbon benefits and economic impacts is concave. Along a given Pareto 
optimal frontier (i.e., a given PES total budget), (1) an increase in the weight assigned to 
economic impacts with a corresponding decrease in the weight assigned to forest carbon 
benefits increases economic impacts while reducing forest carbon benefits and vice versa, 
and (2) the increase in economic impacts is relatively higher than the sacrifice in forest 
carbon benefits when the initial weight assigned to economic impacts is relatively lower 
than the initial weight assigned to forest carbon benefits and vice versa. Because of the 
concavity of the Pareto optimal relationship, assigning greater weight to an objective, 
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which is of minimal concern at the initial policy-making stage, makes sense if 
conservation agencies add that objective to a multiple-objective targeting framework. For 
example, assigning a positive weight to economic impacts yields higher economic 
impacts for a lower sacrifice of forest carbon benefits when the initial optimal spatial 
target focuses on promoting cost-efficient forest carbon benefits without concern for 
providing economic impacts. The concavity of the Pareto optimal relationship can be 
explained by the law of increasing opportunity cost, implying that as an increase in the 
weight assigned to economic impacts (or forest carbon benefits) rises, the opportunity 
cost of economic growth (or forest carbon benefits) increases (Nicholson and Snyder 
2011). 
The tradeoff between ecological benefits and economic impacts is not unique to 
forest carbon storage, and many PES programs face the same issue. Our empirical 
framework can be applied to other PES programs that have the dual objectives of 
promoting efficient ecosystem services and providing economic impacts. This approach 
takes advantage of multiple models in one framework to estimate values for both 
objectives and inputs them into an optimization model. Hence, our framework is feasible 
for PES programs when both ecological and economic impacts are available. For 
example, our framework for spatial PES targeting can be used for the multiple objectives 
of maximizing both biodiversity and economic impacts if a model can estimate changes 
in regional biodiversity (e.g., species distribution model) that correspond with land-use 
changes triggered by payments for biodiversity enhancement. The economic impacts of 




As a final note, it is worth to point out other researchers’ claim that integrating 
distributive impacts may undermine the major purpose of PES, improving the efficiency 
of conservation of ecosystem services (Engel et al. 2008; TEEB 2010; Kinzig et al. 
2011). This argument states that while PES has potential implications for other attributes 
such as equitability, it is better to address these issues separately. The claim is based on 
“Tinbergen rule” of the classical theory of economic policy (Tinbergen 1952) which 
states an equal number of policy instruments should be applied to achieve a certain 
number of policy targets. In practice, it may be better for local development if the 
available budget is split and a portion is given to cost efficient forest conservation and 
another portion to economic development. This contrasts with putting all funds allocated 
to PES according to the Pareto optimal frontiers and hoping the payments trickle down to 
local development. Overall, however, we still think it is important to understand spatial 
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Table 2.1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variables 
 
Definition       Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Dependent variable   
    Change in forest share Ratio of forested area between the 
beginning and the end of a given period 
(i.e., 2001-2006 and 2006-2011) 
      0.991 
     (0.023) 
Economic variables   
    Forest return relative  
    to crop return 
First year’s annual forest return relative to  
annual return from crops ($/hectare)  
  -246.686 
  (915.712) 
    Forest return relative  
    to pasture return 
First year’s annual forest return relative to 
annual return from pasture ($/hectare)  
     14.226 
    (21.020) 
    Forest return relative 
    to urban return 
First year’s annual forest return relative to 
annual return from urban use ($/hectare) 
    -53.017 
 (1,603.387) 
Geophysical variables   
    Average elevation Average elevation (meter)      71.063       
  (216.703) 
    Average slope Average slope (degree)        2.485 
      (1.335) 
    Appalachian forest  
    ecoregion 
1 if county is in central Appalachian forest  
ecoregion, 0 otherwise 
       0.340 
      (0.474) 
    Cumberlands and southern     
    ridge and valley ecoregion 
1 if county is in Cumberlands and Southern 
Ridge and Valley ecoregion, 0 otherwise 
       0.479 
      (0.500) 
    Alabama 1 if county is in Alabama, 
0 otherwise 
       0.097 
      (0.296) 
    Georgia 1 if county is in Georgia, 
0 otherwise 
       0.079 
      (0.271) 
    Kentucky 1 if county is in Kentucky, 
0 otherwise 
       0.121       
      (0.327) 
    Maryland 1 if county is in Maryland, 
0 otherwise 
       0.013 
      (0.117) 
    North Carolina 1 if county is in North Carolina, 
0 otherwise 
       0.083 
      (0.276) 
    Pennsylvania 1 if county is in Pennsylvania, 
0 otherwise 
       0.131 
      (0.338) 
    Tennessee 1 if county is in Tennessee, 
0 otherwise 
       0.152 
      (0.360) 
    Virginia 1 if county is in Virginia, 
0 otherwise 
       0.190 
      (0.393) 
    West Virginia 1 if county is in West Virginia, 
0 otherwise 
       0.118 
      (0.322) 
Year variable   
    Period dummy variable 1 if period is 2006-2011, 
0 otherwise  
       0.500 












      Constant  -0.004 
(0.011) 
Economic variables  
      Forest return relative to  
          crop return (× 0.00001) 
0.005 
(0.131) 
      Forest return relative to  
          pasture return (× 0.001) 
0.048 
(0.067) 
      Forest return relative to  
          urban return (× 0.00001) 
0.629* 
  (0.068) 
Geophysical variables  
      Average elevation (× 0.00001)   0.378 
 (0.751) 
      Average slope (× 0.01)  -0.049 
 (0.114) 
      Appalachian forest ecoregion   -0.009 
 (0.005) 
      Cumberlands and southern 
          ridge and valley ecoregion  
 -0.012* 
 (0.004) 
      Alabama (× 0.1)  -0.004 
 (0.105) 
      Georgia   0.001 
 (0.010) 
      Kentucky   0.001 
 (0.010) 
      Maryland   0.013 
 (0.013) 
      North Carolina (× 0.1)   0.008 
 (0.099) 
      Pennsylvania   0.012 
 (0.010) 
      Tennessee (× 0.1)  -0.005 
 (0.101) 
      Virginia   0.006 
 (0.010) 
      West Virginia   0.004 
 (0.010) 
Year variable  




Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level.   
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Table 2.3. Total carbon storage (TC), gross domestic product (GDP), carbon-cost efficiency (CCE), and economic-cost 





























100.0 / 0.0 304,706 2,009,310 0.2635 1.737 296,215 1,360,552 0.384 1.765 225,685 674,178 0.585 1.749 
87.5 / 12.5 304,362 2,020,011 0.2632 1.747 295,802 1,367,666 0.383 1.774 224,093 684,703 0.581 1.776 
75.0 / 25.0 304,105 2,024,047 0.2630 1.750 294,948 1,369,845 0.382 1.777 222,502 689,837 0.577 1.789 
62.5 / 37.5 303,847 2,026,536 0.2628 1.752 293,850 1,371,336 0.381 1.779 220,721 693,912 0.572 1.800 
50.0 / 50.0 303,599 2,028,704 0.2625 1.754 292,291 1,372,491 0.379 1.780 218,320 696,821 0.566 1.808 
37.5 / 62.5 303,318 2,030,540 0.2623 1.756 289,838 1,373,595 0.376 1.782 214,840 699,566 0.557 1.815 
25.0 / 75.0 302,879 2,032,036 0.2619 1.757 285,937 1,375,901 0.371 1.785 209,650 703,277 0.543 1.824 
12.5 / 87.5 301,461 2,033,010 0.2607 1.758 277,059 1,379,444 0.359 1.789 199,608 708,448 0.517 1.838 
   0.0 / 100.0 271,817 2,036,105 0.2350 1.761 191,186 1,392,523 0.248 1.806 133,754 720,335 0.347 1.869 









Figure 2.2. Estimated total forestland area that would have been discouraged from 
urban development subsequent to total increase of forest return (total payment to 

















Figure 2.6. Optimal allocated payment budget spatial distribution under the 50% budget scenario with nine weighting 
scenarios involving the objectives of maximizing forest carbon storage and maximizing economic impacts (𝑾𝑾𝒄𝒄 :  𝑾𝑾𝒆𝒆)
87.5 : 12.5 75 : 25 
62.5 : 37.5 50 : 50 37.5 : 62.5 
25 : 75 12.5 : 87.5 0 : 100 
100 : 0 
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Figure 2.8. Pareto optimal frontiers between optimal forest carbon storage and 



























Chapter 3: Spatial targeting of payments for ecosystem services to achieve 





The objective of this research is to identify optimal spatial targets and optimally 
distributed budgets that achieve the multiple objectives of improving cost efficiency of 
payment systems for ecosystem services (PES) and promoting equity and economic 
development through PES. Using multi-objective linear programming with three 
objective functions obtained from four modeling frameworks (i.e., land-use model, 
carbon simulation model, poverty alleviation model, and Impact Analysis for Planning 
model), we derive optimal spatial distributions of payment budgets for four priority 
scenarios. The results show that the optimal budgets are more geographically widespread 
under the multiple-objective priority scenarios than under the single-objective of 
maximizing carbon cost efficiency, and the optimal spatial distributions of the four 
priority scenarios do not change appreciably across priority scenarios. By aggregating the 
three objective values under the four priority scenarios, the relationships between the 
three objectives are quantified. Changing the priority weights from 100% on carbon cost 
efficiency to weights of 50% on carbon cost efficiency and 50% on poverty alleviation 
efficiency or 50% on carbon cost efficiency and 50% on economic impact demonstrates 
competitive trade-off between the objective of carbon cost efficiency and the objectives 
of poverty alleviation and economic impact, and a synergistic relationship between 
poverty alleviation and economic impact. Our findings can be used as a benchmark for 






1.   Introduction 
1.1. Background and objective  
As global concern mounts around the issue of climate change, increasing and 
sustaining forest-based carbon sequestration has proven to be a cost-effective way of 
mitigating atmospheric carbon (Dwyer et al. 1992). Despite its potential for climate 
change mitigation, landowners do not consider the value of forest-based carbon 
sequestration when making market-based land-use decisions. Payment systems for 
ecosystem services (PES), like forest-based carbon sequestration, have received 
considerable attention recently as a policy tool to internalize the value of ecosystem 
services into land-use decision making (Engel et al. 2008; Farley and Costanza 2010). 
Notwithstanding the recent popularity of PES, command and control government 
engagement to improve ecosystem services is controversial due to cost ineffectiveness 
(Harrington and Morgenstern 2004). Still, payments for forest-based carbon sequestration 
have become more appealing with growing opportunities for private landowners to 
participate in the forestry sector (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Kroeger and Casey 
2007).   
The use of PES is often viewed as a means to achieve conservation goals while 
promoting social equity and rural economic development (Bremer et al. 2014). The 
literature focusing on conservation goals has dealt with improving the cost efficiency of 
PES related to return-on-investment (ROI) and spatial targeting (Babcock et al. 1997; 
Antle et al. 2003; Barton et al. 2003; Ferraro 2004; Claassen et al. 2008; Engel et al. 
2008; Gibbons et al. 2011; Armsworth et al. 2012; Hanley et al. 2012). These studies 
commonly find that the cost efficiency of PES depends on the optimization of scarce 
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financial resources by accounting for the spatial distributions of the costs and benefits of 
ecosystem services and their relationship (Antle et al. 2003).  
The literature focusing on the balance among cost efficiency, social equity, and 
rural economic development has evolved to help design PES that achieve conservation 
goals while promoting social equity and rural economic development. Nevertheless, their 
relationships are complex and include both trade-offs and synergies (Pascual et al. 2010; 
Gross-Camp et al. 2012). The trade-off between cost efficiency and social equity in the 
rural economic development framework is often quantified by developing an efficiency-
equity frontier (Pascual et al. 2009; Pascual et al. 2010; Wu and Yu 2017). Likewise, a 
synergistic relationship can be developed between achieving environmental objectives 
through PES and improving social equity for a rural community (Zhang and Pagiola 
2011; Barrett et al. 2013; Pascual et al. 2014; Kearney et al. 2017).  
The literature emphasizes the need for PES design to integrate equity into 
efficiency-driven spatial targeting (Pascual et al. 2014). Despite the need, few, if any, 
studies that focus on improving cost efficiency of PES have integrated equity into the 
spatial targeting decision-making process. Another gap in the literature is the lack of 
studies that include both optimal spatial targeting and the economic impact of PES. 
The objective of this research is to fill the gap in the PES literature by identifying 
spatial targets that optimally allocate a given budget to achieve the multiple objectives of 
improving cost efficiency and promoting equity and economic development. We evaluate 
trade-off and synergistic relationships among the three objectives. We use the Central and 
Southern Appalachian Region of the United States (see Figure 3.1.) as a case study to 
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develop a county-level framework to identify optimal county targets and optimal budget 
allocations for forest-based carbon sequestration that address the three objectives.  
We implement the case study by using multi-objective linear programming 
(MOLP) (Lieberman 2014) based on three objective functions: (i) maximizing forest-
based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency, (ii) alleviating maximum poverty for 
promoting equity, and (iii) promoting economic impact for economic development. The 
MOLP is applied under multiple weighting scenarios among the three objectives, given a 
fixed payment budget. By comparing the optimal solutions under the multiple weighting 
scenarios, we evaluate trade-off and synergistic relationships among the objectives.  
Our results will help conservation agencies understand how optimal spatial 
targeting and optimal budget allocations change with different weighting schemes. 
Specifically, conservation agencies can optimally target and allocate budgets to counties 
based on their preferences among the different weighting scenarios with regard to the 
trade-offs and synergies among the objectives of improving the cost efficiency of carbon 
storage, decreasing poverty, and increasing economic impact of PES.  
 
1.2.  Literature review 
Improving the cost efficiency of PES requires accounting for spatial variations in 
the benefits and opportunity costs of ecosystem services. However, measuring and 
monitoring their benefits and costs is challenging and potentially expensive (Richards and 
Stokes 2004; Kim and Langpap 2015). Researchers have attempted to overcome these 
challenges through an approach that allows estimating the spatial heterogeneity in the 
conservation benefits and opportunity costs (Antle 2003; Fraser 2009; Armsworth et al. 
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2011; Gibbons et al. 2011; Lewis et al. 2011; Hanley et al. 2012; Polasky et al. 2014; 
Kim and Langpap 2015). Despite abundant literature on the efficiency of incentive 
payment approaches, the literature focusing on mitigating the financial burden of 
providing ecosystem services often ignores the social equity and economic impacts of the 
payments (Antle 2003; Barton et al. 2003; Montagnini and Nair 2004; Classen et al. 
2008; Gibbons et al. 2011; Mason and Plantinga 2011; Armsworth et al. 2012; Cho et al. 
2017).  
A body of literature has evolved around the balance between cost efficiency and 
social equity in a rural economic development framework mainly because PES are often 
designed to meet environmental goals at the expense of equity (Pascual et al. 2014). An 
important question motivating the literature deals with the balance between cost 
efficiency and social equity in designing PES (Dietz and Atkinson 2010; Muradian et al. 
2010; García-Amado et al. 2011; Narloch et al. 2011; Gross-Camp et al. 2012; Mahanty 
2013; Kolinjivadi et al. 2015). An efficiency-equity frontier has been used to quantify this 
trade-off (or synergistic) relationship to facilitate PES disign (e.g., Pascual et al. 2009; 
Pascual et al. 2010; Wu and Yu 2017). The poverty rate or an equity indicator, such as 
the Gini Coefficient, typically has been used to measure equity improvements through 
PES (Zilberman et al. 2008; Pascual et al. 2010; Garcia-Amado et al. 2011; McDermott et 
al. 2013; Wu and Yu 2017).  
Although the literature has been successful in analyzing the relationship between 
cost efficiency and social equity, few, if any, of those studies provide spatial targeting 
information about how to geographically allocate a conservation budget. In addition, the 
literature dealing with optimal spatial targeting downplays the economic impacts of PES 
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(Mundell 2002). Thus, developing a framework that simultaneously addresses cost 
efficiency, equity and economic development objectives is critical in evaluating optimal 
spatial targeting of PES budgets.  
 
2. Method 
We use four modeling frameworks, all at the county level, to establish the three 
objective functions in the MOLP. For objective function (i), we develop a land-use model 
(see subsection 2.1. for details) to determine the amount of forestland not converted to 
other uses when the return to forestland increases due to forest-based carbon incentive 
payments. We then use a carbon simulation model (see subsection 2.2. for details) to 
determine the maximum forest-based carbon storage that can be supplied from the 
forestland changes simulated by the land-use model. For objective function (ii), we 
develop a poverty alleviation model to estimate the reduction in poverty resulting from 
the incentive payments (see subsection 2.3. for details). For objective function (iii), we 
use the Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) model to estimate the economic impact 
per dollar invested through incentive payments (see subsection 2.4. for details). The 
estimates obtained from the four models are the parameters and variables for the three 
objective functions in the MOLP (see subsection 2.5. for details).  
Our discussion focusses on the maps and relationships developed from the MOLP 
and the results from the land-use and poverty alleviation models, which we developed for 
this study. To simplify and to save space, we briefly discuss the carbon simulation and 
IMPLAN models but do not report their results directly, although they are available upon 
request. The MOLP uses the outputs from all four models, and thus we indirectly discuss 
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the results from the carbon simulation and IMPLAN models. In addition, the parameters 
of the carbon simulation and IMPLAN models come from available models developed 
and estimated by the authors for other studies (Cho et al. 2018a, 2018b).   
 
 
2.1.  Land-use model 
 Land-use change models have been used to estimate the relationship between 
land-use choices and relative returns in the forestry and agricultural sectors for the 
purposes of linking opportunity costs of forest and farmland with deforestation and 
farmland loss, and they have been used to derive cost functions for forest- and farm-based 
carbon storage (Lubowski et al. 2006; Lubowski et al. 2008). Aggregate land-use data, 
such as our county-level data, have been used to explain how the share of land in counties 
or larger geographic areas shifts from one land use to another over a transition period 
(referred to as “land-use share model”) (e.g., Ahn et al. 2000; Hardie et al. 2000; Cho et 
al. 2005; Sohngen and Brown 2006; Ahn 2008). Following the general framework of the 
land-use share model, we specify the expected shares as a logistic function of a linear 
combination of decision variables:                                  
                                                      𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝑘𝑘) =  
𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡(𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)
∑ exp (𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1
 ,                                                   (1) 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝑘𝑘) is the expected share of land allocated to land-use 𝑘𝑘 in year t in county i, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 




If we assume forestland and non-forestland are the only two land uses and divide 
the share of forestland by the share of non-forestland (referred to as “relative forestland 
share”), the logistic transformation of equation (1) yields: 
 ln�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝑘𝑘 = 1)/𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝑘𝑘 ≠ 1)� = 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘=1′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘≠1′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, (2) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝑘𝑘 = 1) and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝑘𝑘 ≠ 1) are, respectively, the share of forestland and the share of 
non-forestland (crop, pasture, and urban land) in year t in county i. All variables that 
explain spatial correlation among relative forestland shares cannot be included in 
equation (2), which leads to biased estimates and spatially correlated errors (Cho and 
Newman 2005; Carrión-Flores et al. 2009).  
These problems are frequently handled by ad hoc specification using a spatial 
weight matrix (Anselin 1988). Following the ad hoc approach, we hypothesize that the 
natural log of relative forestland share for county i in year t is a function of forest return, 
average return of non-forested land uses, and the relative forestland shares within the 
neighboring counties defined by the weight matrix, ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘 = 1)/𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘 ≠ 1)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 , 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is element (i, j) of the N × N spatial weight matrix W: 
        ln�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝑘𝑘 = 1)/𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝑘𝑘 ≠ 1)� = 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑡𝑡 𝑋𝑋𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦 +𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖
𝑦𝑦 + 𝜆𝜆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡        (3) 
where j represents the jth neighboring county, X is a vector of explanatory variables 
including annual forest return and annual average return of non-forested land uses 
(weighted average of returns from crop, pasture, and urban lands, with land shares as 
weights), 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 is a scaler parameter, 𝑋𝑋𝑦𝑦 is a parameter for spatially lagged relative 
forestland share, 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦 is a parameter vector, 𝜇𝜇𝑦𝑦 and 𝜆𝜆𝑦𝑦 respectively denote unobserved 
spatial and time specific effects, and 𝜖𝜖 is an error term.  
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Annual forest return is included in X because it is the baseline return for 
sustaining forestland, while the weighted annual average return of non-forested land uses 
controls for the effects of returns from other land uses on relative forestland share. Slope 
and elevation variables control for the effects of topographic characteristics on relative 
forestland share. Year dummy variables, indicating the years in which the relative 
forestland shares are observed (i.e., 1992 and 2001 dummy variables and 2011 as a 
reference year), capture the time specific effects. Ecoregion dummy variables (i.e., 
dummy variables for the Central Appalachian Forest Ecoregion and the Cumberlands and 
Southern Ridge and Valley Ecoregion, with the Southern Blue Ridge Ecoregion as the 
reference ecoregion) are included in 𝑋𝑋 to capture the spatial specific effects.  
We aggregate data at a 30m × 30m resolution to the county level in 1992, 2001, 
and 2011 from the National Land-Cover Dataset (NLCD) (U.S. Geological Survey 2016) 
to construct county-level areas of forestland and non-forested land. We merge the NLCD 
classifications of deciduous forest, evergreen forest, and mixed forest for forestland. Non-
forested land includes the classifications of cultivated cropland, pasture/hay, 
grass/herbaceous land, developed open space, developed low intensity, developed 
medium intensity, developed high intensity, and other NLCD classifications. 
We use Faustmann’s model (1849) to estimate forest return using the harvest 
timber volume data from the Forest Inventory and Analysis database (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture Forest Service 2017) and stumpage price data from Timber Mart-South 
(2006, 2011). The average return of non-forested land uses is calculated by taking the 
weighted average of crop, pasture, and urban returns, with land shares as weights, at the 
county level for each of the three years. The details of how the four returns are calculated 
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are provided in the supplementary materials in Cho et al. (2017). Average slope and 
elevation at the county level are estimated using Zonal Statistics tool in ArcGIS 10.1 
(ESRI 2012) and a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) (U.S. Geological Survey 2013).  
We adopt the spatial panel model with an instrumental variable (IV) to deal with 
the endogeneity of the forest return and average return of non-forested land uses that can 
be caused by the error term being correlated with the return variables (See Table S.2. in 
Appendix for the IV test and S.3. for the 1st stage land-use model). We estimate the 
spatial panel IV model with Maximum Likelihood Spatial Autocorrelation (SAC) Panel 
Regression using the STATA module of SPREGSACXT (Shehata and Mickaiel 2013). 
See Table 3.1. for a detailed description of the variables used in the estimation.  
 
2.2.  Carbon simulation model 
We estimate changes in carbon storage from changes in relative forestland shares 
at the county level in each year using a long-run dynamic ecological process called the 
Terrestrial Ecosystem Model (TEM), housed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
(ORNL) (2016). The TEM isolates changes in long-term stored carbon that would result 
from changes in land use by focusing on a comparison between relative forestland shares 
with and without payments. The TEM uses spatially-related information (i.e. climate, 
elevation, soils and vegetation) to estimate the carbon, nitrogen and water fluxes for each 
vegetation cohort, with cohorts aggregated within each county to conform with the 
resolution of the land-use model (ORNL 2016). The number of cohorts in a county varies 
according to vegetation types and their areas within each 1 km2 grid cell (Gutman and 
Reissell 2011). Carbon storage is calculated using monthly estimates provided by the 
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TEM cohort-level carbon pools for each of the four years and grid cells, based on 
integrating the monthly fluxes to account for the net total of carbon uptake through 
photosynthesis against carbon losses.  
 
2.3.  Poverty alleviation model 
While PES do not target poverty alleviation exclusively, incentive payments are 
assumed to be similar to subsidy programs that target poverty alleviation. Numerous 
studies deal with the consequences of subsidy programs that focus on various aspects of 
poverty, such as health care, housing, education, and public welfare (Rosen 1985; 
Smeeding et al. 1993; Besley and Kanbur 1998; Santiago et al. 2001; Schultz 2004; Fan 
et al. 2008; Mehmood and Sadiq 2010; Jung et al. 2015; Remler et al. 2017). Those 
studies quantify the impacts on poverty reduction by assuming that assistance to the poor 
through subsidy programs positively affect reducing poverty (Fan et al. 2000; Afonso and 
St Aubyn 2004; Smeeding 2006). In addition, those studies have demonstrated the spatial 
nature of poverty (Friedman and Lichter 1998; Blank 2005; Partridge and Rickman 2005; 
DeNavas-Walt 2010).  
Given evidence from the poverty literature, spatially persistent poverty rates are 
expected to decline over time as annual forest returns increase through incentive 
payments. Thus, we hypothesize that the poverty rate in county i, in year t+n minus 
poverty rate in year t (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛~𝑡𝑡, referred to as “poverty rate mitigation”) is a function of 
forest return and average return of non-forested land uses (i.e., urban, pasture, and crop) 
and poverty rates in year t within the neighboring counties defined by the weight matrix, 
∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 , where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is element (i, j) of the N × N spatial weight matrix W. We test 
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the hypothesis by estimating the following spatial panel model similar to Jung et al. 
(2015):  
(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛~𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼 + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑡𝑡 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 +𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,     (4) 
where j represents the jth county, X is a vector of explanatory variables including forest 
return and average return of non-forested land uses, demographic and employment 
characteristics, and the time-period dummy variable (i.e., 1 for observation in t+n = 2001 
and t = 1992, 0 for observation in t+n = 2011 and t = 2001), 𝛼𝛼 is a constant parameter, 𝑋𝑋 
is a parameter for the spatially lagged poverty rate, 𝛽𝛽 is a parameter vector, 𝜇𝜇 and 𝜆𝜆 
respectively denote unobserved spatial and time specific effects, and 𝜀𝜀 is an error term. 
Note that the poverty rate is the percentage of individuals with incomes below the US 
Census Bureau poverty threshold based on the family size and the age of its member 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2017a).  
 Previous literature shows that income derived from natural-resource use plays a 
significant role in mitigating poverty (Cavendish 1999; Reddy and Chakravarty 1999; 
Adhikari 2003; Fisher 2004; Narain et al. 2008; Nielsen et al. 2012; Fonta and Ayuk 
2013). The forest return captures the effect of forest return on poverty mitigation and can 
be used to simulate the effect on poverty mitigation of hypothetical carbon incentive 
payments. The average return of non-forested land uses captures the effect on the poverty 
rate of the returns from other land uses as alternatives income sources. We hypothesize 
that both the forest return and the average return of non-forested land in year t are 
positively related to poverty mitigation between years t and t+n.  
 The demographic variables include racial composition (i.e., population 
percentages of White, Asia-Pacific Islanders, and other races) with the population 
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percentage of Blacks as the reference category; age distribution (i.e., population 
percentages below 18 years of age, between 18 and 24 years, 65 years of age or older) 
with the population percentage between 25 and 64 years of age as the reference category; 
and socioeconomic status (i.e., population percentages with difficulty speaking English, 
female household heads, at least some college education, living in multiple-worker 
households) with the population percentages not in these respective categories as the 
reference categories. The employment variables include percentages of total employment 
in different industries (i.e., agriculture, manufacture, public, finance, and leisure) with the 
information, professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management 
service industries (referred to as “other employment percentage”) as the reference 
category. The demographic and employment variables are control variables that influence 
changes in the poverty rate (e.g., House 1989; Fujiura and Yamaki 2000; Aassve et al. 
2006; Hoynes et al. 2006; Engster 2012; Jung et al. 2015). The demographic and 
employment data are collected from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1990) and the 
U.S. Census Bureau (2000, 2010). 
We failed to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the forest return and the 
average return of non-forested land uses at the 5% significance level. Thus, we estimated 
the spatial panel model without IV with Maximum Likelihood Estimation Spatial 
Autocorrelation (SAC) Panel Regression using the STATA module of SPREGSACXT 
(Shehata and Mickaiel 2013). See Table 3.2. for a detailed description of the variables 





2.4.      Impact analysis for planning 
The IMPLAN model uses a regional social accounting system and generates a set 
of balanced economic/social accounts and multipliers. The social accounting system is an 
extension of input-output analysis. Input-output analysis can provide important and 
timely information on the interrelationships in a regional economy and the impacts of 
changes on that economy. To estimate the economic impacts of payments for ecosystem 
services, expenditures on various inputs were incorporated into IMPLAN. Input‐output 
models analyze the interdependence of industries in an economy through market-based 
transactions. The model describes the transfer of money between industries and 
institutions and contains both market and non‐market financial flows, such as inter 
institutional transfers. Output from the model includes descriptive measures of the 
economy including total industry output (i.e., economic activity), total value‐added, state 
and local taxes, and employment for 536 industries in the study region's economy. We 
used the total value-added to represent the economic impact from the PES because total 
value-added is considered gross domestic product and usually represents overall 
development (Anríquez and Stamoulis 2007). The IMPLAN model utilizes a National 
Trade Flows Model (NTFM) (doubly‐constrained gravity model) to estimate a new set of 
regional purchase coefficients and other trade data that predict local purchases based on a 
region’s characteristics (Lindall et al. 2006). Not only can the model be used to describe a 
regional economy, but the model also can be used for predictive purposes, by providing 
estimates of multipliers. This analysis uses the local purchase percentages option 
available in the IMPLAN modeling. These percentages affect the impact values applied 
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to the multipliers. The multiplier impacts can be used to evaluate, measure, and compare 
results of different economic scenarios. 
 
2.5.  Multi-objective linear programming 
We use MOLP for the three objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon 
storage, alleviating maximum poverty, and promoting maximum economic impacts. 
Following Lieberman (2014)’s two-step optimization procedure, we use a single-
objective optimization problem for each of the three objectives in the first step using a 
Matlab module called fmincon and a multi-objective optimization problem in the second 
step using a Matlab module called fminimax (MathWorks 2017a, 2017b).  
In the first step, decision variables (i.e., a continuous decimal number from 0 to 1 
with 0 defining zero share and 1 full share of forestland in each county) are determined 
by satisfying each of the three objectives separately under a hypothetical annual budget of 
$5 million (50% of budget needed to reach maximum carbon storage capacity). In the 
second step, new decision variables that satisfy all three objectives at the same time are 
determined by minimizing the maximum percentage gap between the three single target 
values (i.e., sum of products of the decision variables from the first step and the total 
quantity of their respective objective values) and their corresponding multi-objective 
optimal values (i.e., sum of products of the new decision variables and the total quantity 
of their respective objective values) for each county under the budget constraint. The 
three percentage gaps are multiplied by four types of hypothetical weight values (i.e., 1 
type of single objective of 100% weight on maximizing forest carbon storage; 2 types of 
dual objectives of 50% weight on maximizing forest carbon storage and 50% weight on 
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alleviating maximum poverty for promoting equity and 50% weight on maximizing forest 
carbon storage and 50% on promoting economic impact for economic development; 1 
type of triple objectives of 33% weight on maximizing forest carbon storage, 33% weight 
on alleviating maximum poverty for promoting equity, 33% weight on promoting 
economic impact for economic development) to represent policy priority scenarios 
between the three objectives.  
 
3.       Empirical results and discussion  
Table 3.3. reports the parameter estimates and standard errors from the land-use 
model in equation (3) based on an inverse-distance weight matrix. Our choice of that 
model is based the model with the minimum log-likelihood ratio (LLR). (See Table S.4. 
in Appendix for the full report of LLR for the all candidate models.) The overall 
performance of the model is reflected in its adjusted R2 of 0.526. The F-test statistics of 
233.784 indicates that the overall estimation of the model is significant at the 5% level. 
The parameter estimates and lack of statistical significance of the spatial lag dependent 
variable and the spatial error variable imply that the problem of spatially correlated 
missing variables is not as extensive as is suggested in the literature, which is likely due 
to the use county-level data (Chou 1991).   
The significant (5% level) estimate of the forest return variable (0.03) suggests 
that an increase of forest return by $1/hectare increases the relative forestland share in 
each county by 0.03%. This result is crucial to our analysis because it indicates that 
supplying forest-based carbon storage is feasible through a carbon incentive payment 
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system, and that the impacts on the county-level amounts of forest-carbon storage 
supplied can be estimated using the carbon simulation model.   
As for the geophysical variables, parameter estimates for the average elevation, 
slope and ecoregion dummy variables are significant at the 5% level, suggesting the 
importance of these control variables in estimating parameter of the forest return variable. 
The estimation suggests that counties with higher elevations and steeper slopes tend to 
have greater relative forestland share. Also, signs of the two ecoregion dummy variables 
suggest that relative forestland shares are lower in the Cumberlands and Southern Ridge 
and Valley Ecoregion, and in the Central Appalachian Forest Ecoregion than in the 
Southern Blue Ridge Ecoregion. These findings reflect that topographic characteristics of 
the Southern and Central Appalachian Region are such that more forest cover tends to be 
in landscape regions with high elevation and steep slope and more dense forest cover 
exist in Southern Blue Ridge Ecoregion than in the other two ecoregions. The more dense 
forest cover in Sothern Blue Ridge Ecoregion may be relevant to the fact that this 
ecoregion has the third highest number of hardwood and conifer endemics in North 
America (Ricketts et al. 1999). 
The parameter estimates for the 1992 and 2001 year dummy variables suggest that 
the relative forestland share in 1992 was greater than in 2011, but the relative forestland 
share in 2001 was smaller than in 2011. These findings suggest that afforestation and 
reforestation efforts between 2001 and 2011 may have been successful and/or that 
deforestation diminished during that period perhaps partially due to the great recession of 
2007-2009, although forestland decreased on average over the 19-year study period.    
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Table 3.4. reports parameter estimates and corresponding standard errors of the 
poverty model in equation (4) using the 9-nearest neighbor weight matrix (KNN=9). The 
KNN=9 model has the minimum LLR (see Table S.4. in Appendix for the full report). 
The adjusted R2 of the model is 0.773 and the F-statistics of 257.402 is significant at the 
5% level, suggesting that the model performs relatively well in terms of explanatory 
power. The spatial lag and error variables are not significant at the 5% level. 
 The parameter estimate for the forest return variable in the poverty model is -
0.016 and significant at the 5% level, implying that an increase of forest return by 
$1/hectare yields an average poverty rate reduction of 1.6% annually over the 19-year 
period. This finding suggests that forest return has a significant effect on mitigating 
poverty, and thus forest-based carbon incentive payments that trigger an increase in forest 
return would not only increase carbon storage, but also mitigate poverty. Thus, dollars 
expended on incentive payments to prevent forestland conversion to other land uses 
would mitigate poverty as well. 
 The parameter estimates for three variables (i.e., population percentages between 
18 and 24 years of age, living in households with two or more workers, and employment 
in manufacture) are significant at the 5% level. The positive sign on the percentage of 
population between 18 and 24 years of age suggests that an increase in this variable, 
relative to the population percentage between 25 and 64 years of age at the beginning of 
each period, increases the poverty rate at the end of each period. The negative sign on the 
population percentage living in households with two or more workers suggests that an 
increase in this variable at the beginning of each period prompts a reduction in the 
poverty rate at the end of each period. The positive sign on the percentage of employment 
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in the manufacturing sector suggests that higher employment in manufacturing, relative 
to the employment percentage in other sectors at the beginning of each period, increases 
the poverty rate at the end of each period. This finding is explained by the fact that 
manufacturing employment increased in 27% of counties (76 out of 285 counties), and in 
all of these counties, the employment percentage in other sectors decreased during the 
study period. Thus, the finding is logical considering other sectors generally have higher 
wages than the manufacturing sector. The parameter estimate of 1992-2001 dummy 
variable suggests that the poverty rate during the 1992-2001 period was lower than during 
the 2001-2011 period. This finding makes sense given the poverty rate increased in the 
United States by 1.3 percentage points from 13 percent to 14.3 percent during the great 
recession of 2007-2009 (U.S. Census Bureau 2017b).   
 Figures 3.2.-a, 3.2.-b, 3.2.-c, and 3.2.-d show optimal spatial distributions of 
payment budgets for a single objective weight, two types of dual objective weights, and 
triple objective weights, respectively, reflecting different priorities between the three 
objectives (referred to as priority scenarios I, II, III, and IV). Figure 3.2.-a illustrates the 
spatial distribution of an optimally allocated budget among counties for 100% priority on 
cost efficiency of carbon storage. The spatial distribution of this optimally allocated 
budget follows the patterns of the spatial distribution of annual average carbon cost 
efficiencies during the 2001-2011 period shown in Appendix S.5. This visual assessment 
is reinforced for priority scenario I in Table 3.5., which presents the quantities of forest 
carbon sequestration per dollar spent for the four quartiles of the optimally allocated 
budget (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) shown in Figure 3.2.-a. The general pattern shows that larger 
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budgets are allocated to the counties with higher carbon quantities per dollar spent when 
the payment priority is 100% on maximizing carbon cost efficiency.  
The panels of Figure 3.2. illustrate spatial distributions of optimally allocated 
budgets when the priority weights are 50% on carbon cost efficiency and 50% on poverty 
alleviation (Figure 3.2.-b); the priority weights are 50% on carbon cost efficiency and 
50% on economic impact (Figure 3.2.-c); and the priority weights are divided equally 
among the three objectives of carbon cost efficiency, poverty alleviation, and economic 
impact (Figure 3.2.-d). Table 3.5. shows that the spatial patterns of the optimal budget 
allocations for priority scenarios II, III, and IV are difficult generalize from the 
efficiencies of the objectives in the multiple-objective cases, because more than one 
objective is satisfied in deciding how to optimally allocation the payment budget.  
Figures 3.2.-a, 3.2.-b, 3.2.-c, and 3.2.-d illustrate that 63% of counties (or 181 of 
285 counties) are selected for optimal spatial targeting under priority scenario I, while 
74%, 70%, and 73% of counties are selected for optimal spatial targeting under priority 
scenarios II, III, and IV for multiple-objective budget allocations. These findings suggest 
that the spatial targeting of the optimal budget is more widespread among the counties 
under the multiple-objective priority scenarios than under the single-objective of 
maximizing carbon cost efficiency. The results also indicate that the optimal spatial 
distributions do not change appreciably among the four priority scenarios. For example, 
79% of counties (or 44 of 56 counties) remained consistently in the upper quartile of the 
optimal budget allocations of the four priority scenarios. Those targeted counties are in a 
cluster of counties in Pennsylvania, in a cluster of counties in Alabama, and in counties 
more widely dispersed within the study area. 
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Table 3.6. shows trade-off and synergistic relationships among the three 
objectives for the four priority scenarios. In going from priority scenario I (100% priority 
on carbon cost efficiency) to priority scenario II (50% priority on carbon cost efficiency 
and 50% priority on poverty alleviation), 228 persons (or 9.8% increase) are lifted from 
poverty and economic activity increases by $126,967 (or 1.1% increase), for a sacrifice of 
5,866 tonnes of carbon storage (or 2.7% decrease). Likewise, in going from priority 
scenario I to III (50% priority on carbon cost efficiency and 50% priority on economic 
impact), the economic impact increases by $150,181 (or 1.2% increase) and 667 persons 
(or 28.6% increase) are lifted from poverty, for a sacrifice of 9,923 tonnes of carbon 
storage (or 4.6% decrease). These examples demonstrate the competitive relationships 
between the objective of carbon cost efficiency and the objectives of poverty alleviation 
and economic impact, and a synergistic relationship between poverty alleviation and 
economic impact. The synergic effects in both examples suggest that, regardless of 
whether the 50% weight is placed on poverty alleviation or on economic impact, placing 
some priority on either objective reduces poverty and increases economic activity through 
optimal budget reallocations. The synergic effects likely occur likely because counties 
with higher poverty alleviation efficiency and counties with higher economic impact 
efficiency tend to overlap. For example, 69.6% (39 of 56) counties are in the upper 
quartiles (i.e., Q1) of both poverty alleviation efficiency and economic impact efficiency 







 The literature on spatial targeting of conservation investments like PES has 
extensively focused on improving cost efficiency as measured by ROI (e.g., Barton et al. 
2013). The results help conservation agencies allocate scarce financial resources by 
accounting for the spatial distributions of the conservation costs and benefits of 
ecosystem services and their relationships. Although such efforts are important in 
improving PES cost efficiency, they neglect other important PES objectives, namely 
promoting social equity and rural economic development (Mundell 2002; Pascual et al. 
2009). To fill the gap, our research addresses the need to identify optimal spatial targeting 
and distributions of a fixed PES budget that achieve the three objectives of maximizing 
forest-based carbon storage to improve cost efficiency, maximizing poverty alleviation to 
promote equity, and maximizing economic impact to encourage economic development 
using the Central and Southern Appalachian Region of the United States as a case study. 
We also evaluate the trade-off and synergistic relationships using four scenarios with 
different priority weights among the three objectives. 
Using MOLP with three objective functions obtained from four modeling 
frameworks (i.e., land-use model, carbon simulation model, poverty alleviation model, 
and IMPLAN), we derive the optimal spatial distributions of payment budgets for the 
four priority scenarios. The maps of the optimal spatial distributions show that the 
targeting of the optimal budget is more widespread among the counties under the 
multiple-objective priority scenarios than under the single-objective of maximizing 
carbon cost efficiency, and that the optimal spatial budget distributions of the four 
priority scenarios do not change appreciably. 
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The relationships among the objectives are quantified by aggregating and 
comparing the three objective values under the four priority scenarios. The quantified 
relationships reveal that different priority weights among the priority scenarios yield both 
competitive trade-offs and synergistic relationships between the objectives. Changing the 
priority weights from 100% on carbon cost efficiency to weights of 50% on carbon cost 
efficiency and 50% on poverty alleviation efficiency or 50% on carbon cost efficiency 
and 50% on economic impact demonstrates competitive trade-off between the objective 
of carbon cost efficiency and the objectives of poverty alleviation and economic impact, 
and a synergistic relationship between poverty alleviation and economic impact. We 
believe the synergic relationship likely occurs because higher poverty alleviation 
efficiency and higher economic impact efficiency tend to occur in the same counties.  
 The optimal spatial budget distributions under different priority scenarios can be 
used to spatially target PES budgets to encourage forest-based carbon storage, or other 
conservation goals, while also promoting social equity through poverty alleviation and 
rural economic development through increased economic activity. Although the 
optimally allocated budget with the single objective of carbon-cost efficiency is not 
substantially different from the solutions for the multiple-objective optimization 
problems, adjustments can be made in spatial targeting and spatially allocated budget 
amounts based on our results. Further, the quantified trade-off and synergistic 
relationships among the three objectives can be used by conservation agencies to assess 
the costs (trade-offs) or benefits (synergies) of the priorities they place on the objectives. 
Thus, our modeling framework can help conservation agencies adjust their priorities to 
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address other objectives when they view the cost of achieving a single conservation too 
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Table 3.1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for the land-use model 




Definition      Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Dependent variables   
    Share of forest area  
    relative to non-forest area 
Ratio of forested area to non-forested area 
in years, 1992, 2001, and 2011 
   3.489 
  (8.679) 
Socioeconomic variables   
    Forest return  
 
Annual forest return in years 1992, 2001, 
and 2011 ($/hectare) 
   53.778      
  (18.485) 
    Average return of  
    non-forested land  
Annual weighted average return of non-    
forested land, with land shares as weights  
(i.e., crop, pasture, and urban) in years,  
1992, 2001, and 2011 ($/hectare) 
  333.052 
 (507.480) 
Geophysical variables   
    Average elevation Average elevation (meter)   446.756 
 (204.931) 
    Average slope Average slope (degree)       2.156 
     (1.148) 
    Appalachian forest  
  ecoregion 
1 if county is in Central Appalachian Forest 
Ecoregion, 0 otherwise 
      0.336 
     (0.472) 
    Cumberlands and     
    southern ridge and valley     
    ecoregion 
1 if county is in Cumberlands and Southern  
Ridge and Valley Ecoregion, 0 otherwise 
      0.480 
     (0.499) 
Year variable   
    Year 1992  
    dummy variable 
1 if year is 1992, 0 otherwise        0.333 
     (0.471) 
    Year 2001  
    dummy variable 
1 if year is 2001, 0 otherwise        0.333 
     (0.471) 
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Definition     Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Poverty variable   
Poverty rate 
mitigation 
Poverty rate at the end of the period minus  
poverty rate at the beginning of the period  
(i.e., 1992-2001 and 2001-2011) 
    0.471 
   (4.656)  
Socioeconomic variables (at the beginning of the period, 1992 and 2001)  
   Forest return  
 
Annual forest return ($/hectare)    57.955 
  (20.236) 
   Average return of    
   non-forested land  
Annual weighted average return of non-forested 
land (i.e., crop, pasture, and urban) with land shares 
as weights ($/hectare) 
   28.823  
(407.503) 
Demographic variable (at the beginning of the period, 1992 and 2001)  
    White White population divided by total population (%)   94.184 
   (6.395) 
    Asia-Pacific Asia-Pacific population divided by total  
population (%) 
    0.411 
   (0.561) 
    Other races Native Americans and other races excluding white, 
Asian-Pacific, and Black population divided by total 
population (%) 
    2.034 
   (3.211) 
    Age under  
    17 years 
Population aged below 18 years divided by total 
population (%) 
   23.822 
    (2.649) 
    Age between  
    18 - 24 years 
Population aged between 18 and 24 divided by  
total population (%) 
   21.516 
  (11.567) 
    Age over  
    65 years 
Population aged 65 or older divided by total  
population (%) 
   14.335 
    (2.906) 
    English  
    Speaking 
Population aged between 16 and 64 with  
difficulty speaking English divided by total  
population (%) 
     3.219 
     (2.323) 
    Female-headed  
    household 
Population living in female-headed households  
divided by total population (%) 
   24.361 
    (3.439) 
Some college  
    education 
Population with at least some college education  
divided by total population aged 25 or older (%) 
   31.185 
  (10.493) 
    Two or more  
    workers 
Population living in households with two or more  
workers divided by total population (%) 
   18.574 
    (3.355) 
Employment variable (at the beginning of the period, 1992 and 2001) 
    Agriculture Employment in agriculture, forestry,  
fishing, hunting, and mining divided by total 
employment (%) 
     3.301 
    (6.602) 
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Table 3.2. Continued 
Note: All variables are at the county level.  
  
        Variables 
 
Definition     Mean 
(Std Dev) 
   Manufacture Employment in manufacturing and  
construction divided by total employment (%) 
    6.120 
  (14.623) 
    Public Employment in transportation, warehousing, and other 
public utilities divided by total employment (%) 
    8.571         
    (9.988) 
    Finance Employment in Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, 
and leasing divided by total employment (%) 
     3.237 
    (1.637) 
    Leisure Employment in arts, entertainment, recreation, 
accommodation, and food services divided by total 
employment (%) 
     7.987 
    (4.820) 
Year variable 
   Period dummy    
   variable 
1 if year is 1992, 0 otherwise       0.500 
      (0.500) 
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Table 3.3. Parameter estimates of the land-use model from the spatial panel model with 
IV  
Note: Adjusted R2 = 0.526, Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and * denotes 
significance at the 5% level.   
  
                              Variables 
 
                  Coefficient 
              (Std Dev) 
Socioeconomic variables  
    Forest return  
 
                      0.030* 
                     (0.015) 
    Average return of non-forested land (× 0.1)                      -0.004 
                     (0.003) 
Geophysical variables  
    Average elevation (× 0.1)                       0.003* 
                     (0.001) 
    Average slope                       0.172* 
                     (0.053) 
    Appalachian forest ecoregion                      -0.476* 
                     (0.130) 
    Cumberlands and southern ridge and valley  
    ecoregion 
                     -0.069 
                      (0.158) 
Year variable  
    Year 1992 dummy variable                         0.160* 
                      (0.069) 
    Year 2001 dummy variable                       -0.667*   
                      (0.372) 
 Spatial dependence variable  
     Spatial lag                       -0.263 
                      (0.306) 
     Spatial error                        0.333 
                      (0.244) 
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Table 3.4. Parameter estimates of the poverty alleviation model from the spatial panel 
model without IV  
Variables 
 
                     Coefficient  
                      (Std Dev) 
Socioeconomic variables  
    Forest return                           -0.016*  
                         (0.008) 
    Average return of non-forested land (× 0.01)                          -0.007 
                         (0.032) 
Demographic variable  
    White                            0.005 
                         (0.027) 
    Asia-Pacific                           0.186 
                         (0.375) 
    Other races                           0.042                         
                         (0.064) 
    Age under 17 years                          -0.052 
                         (0.090) 
    Age between 18 - 24 years                           0.124* 
                         (0.056) 
    Age over 65 years                          -0.024 
                         (0.085) 
    English Speaking                            0.052 
                         (0.120) 
    Female-headed householder 
 
                          0.099 
                         (0.052) 
    Some college education                           -0.005 
                         (0.023) 
    Two or more workers                          -0.205* 
                         (0.085) 
    Agriculture                           -0.016 
                         (0.029) 
    Manufacture                            0.055* 
                         (0.015) 
    Public                           -0.068 
                         (0.041) 
    Finance                            0.060 
                         (0.083) 
    Leisure                            0.019  







Table 3.4. Continued 
Note: Adjusted R2 = 0.773, Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and * denotes 
significance at the 5% level.
Variables 
 
                          Coefficient  
                           (Std Dev) 
Year variable  
    Period dummy variable                              -2.631*  
                             (1.242) 
Spatial dependence variable 
    Spatial lag                               0.004 
                             (0.102) 
    Spatial error                               0.041 
                             (0.157) 
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Table 3.5. Carbon cost, poverty alleviation, and economic impact cost efficiencies under four priority scenarios by quartile of 




















     Total 
  Economic 
impact ($) 





Q1 19,218 – 737,116 190,710.68 0.047 - - - - 
Q2     3,953 – 19,217   16,600.83 0.042 - - - - 
Q3       1,710 – 3,952     4,189.46 0.035 - - - - 
Q4              1 – 1,709     1,179.44 0.033 - - - - 
 
II 
Q1 15,211 – 737,719 180,321.51 0.046 2,157 0.044 - - 
Q2     5,384 – 15,210   19,736.73 0.036    135 0.023 - - 
Q3       2,149 – 5,383     5,139.84 0.033    237 0.106 - - 
Q4              1 – 2,148     1,617.06 0.034      25 0.024 - - 
 
III 
Q1 16,695 – 737,119 177,065.79 0.047 - - 10,634,567 0.050 
Q2     6,374 – 16,694   16,859.71 0.040 - -      970,578 0.050 
Q3       2,176 – 6,373     7,198.08 0.033 - -      497,349 0.037 
Q4              1 – 2,175     1,634.38 0.034 - -      103,358 0.042 
 
IV 
Q1 16,888 – 737,119 171,916.51 0.046 2,553 0.010 10,294,469 0.046 
Q2     6,551 – 16,887    21,371.71 0.037    169 0.003    1,303,491 0.039 
Q3       2,198 – 6,550      6,138.97 0.033    228 0.012      436,486 0.044 
Q4              1 - 2197      1,740.69 0.035      18 0.003      107,645 0.041 
Note: I, II, III, and IV are single objective of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (100% 
weight), dual objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (50%) and alleviating 
maximum poverty for promoting equity (50%), dual objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for improving cost 
efficiency (50%) and promoting economic impact for economic development (50%), and triple objectives of maximizing 
forest-based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (33%), alleviating maximum poverty for promoting equity (33%), 
and promoting economic impact for economic development (33%), respectively.
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Table 3.6. Total carbon storage, poverty alleviation, and economic impact under a 
hypothetical budget of $5 million (50% of budget needed to reach maximum carbon 
storage capacity) with four weight scenarios 
Note: I, II, III, and IV are single objective of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for 
improving cost efficiency ($100% weight), dual objectives of maximizing forest-based 
carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (50%) and alleviating maximum poverty for 
promoting equity (50%), dual objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for 
improving cost efficiency (50%) and promoting economic impact for economic 
development (50%), and triple objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for 
improving cost efficiency (33%), alleviating maximum poverty for promoting equity 
(33%), and promoting economic impact for economic development (33%), respectively.






I 212,681 2,326 12,055,671 
II 206,815 2,554 12,182,638 
III 202,758 2,993 12,205,852 











Figure 3.2. Optimal spatial distribution of payment budget scenario focusing on single, dual, and triple objectives (I, II, III, 
and IV) 
Note: I, II, III, and IV are single objective of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (100% 
weight), dual objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (50%) and alleviating 
maximum poverty for promoting equity (50%), dual objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for improving cost 
efficiency (50%) and promoting economic impact for economic development (50%), and triple objectives of maximizing 
forest-based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (33%), alleviating maximum poverty for promoting equity (33%), 






















































The two essays examine the optimal spatial targeting of PES under several 
objectives. Through MOLP in the first essay, we identify optimal county-level targets 
with a total conservation budget optimally distributed under 27 alternatives, nine 
weighting scenarios involving the two core objectives multiplied by three budget 
scenarios and identify resulting changes in forest carbon and estimate economic impacts. 
We then develop three tradeoff frontiers between the two objectives that are created from 
the targeted PES for the three budget scenarios. Along each frontier, PES is Pareto 
optimal since forest carbon storage cannot be increased without sacrificing economic 
impacts and vice versa. In the second essay, we implement the case study by using 
MOLP based on three objective functions: (i) maximizing forest-based carbon storage for 
improving cost efficiency, (ii) alleviating maximum poverty for promoting equity, and 
(iii) promoting economic impact for economic development. By comparing the optimal 
solutions under the multiple weighting scenarios, we evaluate trade-off and synergistic 
relationships among the objectives.  
In the empirical result from the first essay, maps of PES optimal budget 
distributions among counties, given different weighting scenarios, provide evidence that, 
the greater the weight assigned to maximizing forest carbon benefits relative to 
maximizing economic impacts, the more widespread the optimal budget is allocated 
among the counties. This finding occurs since the economic-impact objective is more 
dominant in the targeting decision than the carbon-cost efficiency objective, on average. 
Also, along a given Pareto optimal frontier (i.e., a given PES total budget), (1) an 
increase in the weight assigned to economic impacts with a corresponding decrease in the 
weight assigned to forest carbon benefits increases economic impacts while reducing 
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forest carbon benefits and vice versa, and (2) the increase in economic impacts is 
relatively higher than the sacrifice in forest carbon benefits when the initial weight 
assigned to economic impacts is relatively lower than the initial weight assigned to forest 
carbon benefits and vice versa. Because of the concavity of the Pareto optimal 
relationship, assigning greater weight to an objective, which is of minimal concern at the 
initial policy-making stage, makes sense if conservation agencies add that objective to a 
multiple-objective targeting framework. The concavity of the Pareto optimal relationship 
can be explained by the law of increasing opportunity cost, implying that as an increase 
in the weight assigned to economic impacts (or forest carbon benefits) rises, the 
opportunity cost of economic growth (or forest carbon benefits) increases. 
Considering additional poverty alleviation as social equity in the second essay, the 
relationships among the objectives are quantified by aggregating and comparing the three 
objective values under the four priority scenarios. The quantified relationships reveal that 
different priority weights among the priority scenarios yield both competitive trade-offs 
and synergistic relationships between the objectives. Changing the priority weights from 
100% on carbon cost efficiency to weights of 50% on carbon cost efficiency and 50% on 
poverty alleviation efficiency or 50% on carbon cost efficiency and 50% on economic 
impact demonstrates competitive trade-off between the objective of carbon cost 
efficiency and the objectives of poverty alleviation and economic impact, and a 
synergistic relationship between poverty alleviation and economic impact. We believe the 
synergic relationship likely occurs because higher poverty alleviation efficiency and 
higher economic impact efficiency tend to occur in the same counties. The optimal spatial 
budget distributions under different priority scenarios can be used to spatially target PES 
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budgets to encourage forest-based carbon storage, or other conservation goals, while also 
promoting social equity through poverty alleviation and rural economic development 
through increased economic activity. Further, the quantified trade-off and synergistic 
relationships among the multi objectives can be used by conservation agencies to assess 
the costs (trade-offs) or benefits (synergies) of the priorities they place on the objectives. 
Thus, our modeling framework can help conservation agencies adjust their priorities to 
address other objectives when they view the cost of achieving a single conservation too 



















S.1. Expected annual return per hectare of four land uses 
The expected annual return per hectare of forestland (i.e., deciduous forestland 
and evergreen forestland) was estimated using Soil Expectation Value (SEV), which 
represents the present discounted value of the rents earned by an infinite series of 
identical rotations with the same timber management activities (Bettinger et al. 2009). 
The SEV for forestland f (f = deciduous forestland or evergreen forestland) per hectare 











where fP is the stumpage price for forestland f in 2001, fjtQ  is the harvest volume per 
hectare for forestland f in county j at harvest age t, and r is the discount rate of 5%. Here, 
the stumpage price is the price received by the landholder for the forest products after all 
costs of cutting, snigging and haulage have been paid. Following the conventional 
timber-harvesting decision rule, the harvest age t was determined by setting the average 
stumpage value equal to the annual incremental change in stumpage value for forestland 
in county j. Then, fjtQ was obtained by taking the average of the plot-level harvest 
volume per hectare for county j based on the Forest Inventory and Analysis (FIA) 
database (USDA Forest Service 2015).  
The stumpage price for Tennessee was obtained from Timber Mart-South (2015), 
which is a quarterly market price survey report of the major timber products. The 
stumpage price for Kentucky was collected from Growing Gold (Kentucky Division of 
Forestry 2015). The information on harvest volume and rotation age at the county-level 
for deciduous forestland and evergreen forestland was from Smith et al. (2006).  
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Weighted averages in 2001 and 2006 of the SEVs for a county were calculated 
with the shares of the two forestland types in the county as weights. Then, the annualized 
weighted-average SEV per hectare for the county was calculated for each year. The SEV 
is annualized for the following reason: Forestland provides non-annual periodic income 
based on the timber harvest cycle and expected returns from the other three land uses are 
estimated as annual values. The expected returns from the four land uses must be in the 
same unit (i.e., annual US $ per hectare) because they are included as regressors for 
competing land uses in the multinomial logit model. 
Weighted averages of the SEVs for each county j for year t (t = 2001 and 2006), 







= ⋅∑ . 
where fw is the ratio of each tree type in the county and fjtSEV is the SEV for forestland 
type f in county j for year t. Then, the annualized weighted-average SEV per hectare (
jtWSEV
A ) for each forestland type in each county in year t was calculated as:  











where r is the discount rate and n represent a period of 100 years, which can be flexible, 
but should be adequately long. Then, the property tax amounts, which vary by county, 
were subtracted from WSEVA to estimate the expected annual return per hectare of 
forestland after tax. 
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County-level rent per hectare of pastureland was used as the expected net return 
per hectare of pastureland. County-level data for 2001 and 2006 were not available. The 
data were predicted using a fixed-effect model with panel data by regressing county-level 
pastureland rent on state-level pastureland rent and county-level cattle numbers and 
pastureland area for the period of 2008–2012. The latter variables were included under 
the premise that pastureland rent is positively related with the size of the cattle herd and 
the area of pastureland within a county. The pastureland rent data were from National 
Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS 2014) and cattle number data were from Census of 
Agriculture (USDA Census of Agriculture 2012). County-level pastureland area is 
available for 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012 for both states from the Census of Agriculture 
(USDA Census of Agriculture 2012). The area data for unavailable years (i.e., 2008, 
2009, 2010, and 2011) were interpolated assuming an annual average linear increase 
between 1997 and 2012 for the estimation of the fixed effect model and its prediction of 
2001 and 2006 county-level rent per hectare of pastureland. Then, the property tax 
amounts were subtracted from the predicted values for 2001 and 2006 to estimate the 
expected annual net returns per hectare of pastureland after property tax.   
A description of the steps used to estimate the expected annual return per hectare 
of cropland at the county level follows: 
1. The ratio of livestock and poultry cash expenses to total farm production expenses 
was derived;  
2. This ratio was multiplied by total county net cash farm income to give an estimate 
of net cash farm income from livestock and poultry. (Thus, net cash farm income 
is directly and positively correlated with farm production expenses.); 
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3. The estimated net cash farm income from livestock and poultry was subtracted 
from total net cash farm income, resulting in an estimate of net cash farm income 
from cropland;  
4. County-level net cash farm income from cropland was divided by hectares of 
harvested cropland in the county; and  
5. Property taxes per hectare were subtracted from net cash income from cropland 
per hectare for 2001 and 2006 to estimate the expected annual return per hectare 
of cropland after tax.  
A description of the steps used to estimate the expected annual return per hectare 
of urban land at the county level follows: 
1. Parcel-level land value ratios were obtained for counties for which parcel-level 
data were available by dividing assessed land value by total assessed value; 
2. The parcels’ land value ratios were divided by their respective plot sizes to 
obtain land value ratios per hectare; 
3. An OLS regression was performed with the land value ratio per hectare as the 
dependent variable and population density in 2010 and a vector of distance 
variables as explanatory variables. The regression model was specified under the 
premise that (i) the value of a parcel’s land increases relative to the value of its 
single-family house in more urbanized areas that are more densely populated and 
closer to the city center with its associated facilities (Albouy and Ehrlich 2012) 
and (ii) the land value ratio does not fluctuate over time (Bourassa et al. 2011); 
4. The regression coefficients and the respective census-block group data were used 
to estimate the average land value ratio per hectare for each census-block group;   
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5. The average land value ratio per hectare for each census-block group was 
multiplied by the respective median housing price to obtain an estimate of the 
median assessed land value per hectare, which was used as a proxy for the 
expected return per hectare of urban land for each census-block group; and 
The estimates were annualized assuming 100 years and a 5% discount rate and the 
property tax amounts were subtracted from the annualized value to estimate the expected 




S.2. Endogeneity tests for the land use and poverty alleviation models. 
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6.273* 11.400* 0.252 0.06 
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S.3. Parameter estimates of the 1st stage land-use model 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and * denotes significance at the 5% 
level.   
 
  






Average return of 
Non-forested land 
Geophysical variables   
    Average elevation             -0.010* 
            (0.003) 
             0.283* 
            (0.114) 
    Average slope              1.363* 
            (0.552) 
        -166.448* 
          (17.868) 
    Appalachian forest  
    ecoregion 
            -6.601* 
            (1.761) 
        -161.723* 
          (56.948) 
    Cumberlands and southern  
    ridge and valley ecoregion 
             1.748 
            (1.790) 
        -445.190* 
          (57.877) 
Year variable   
    Year 1992 dummy variable               0.457 
            (1.185) 
          -11.528 
          (38.335) 
    Year 2001 dummy variable           -24.019*   
            (1.182) 
           16.211 
          (38.234) 
 Instrument variable   
     Urban influence code             0.674* 
           (0.170) 
          -34.832* 
            (5.500) 
     Natural amenity scale            -3.185* 
           (0.943) 
            -5.507 
          (30.498) 
 
117 
S.4. Goodness-of-fit and marginal effect results for the land-use and poverty alleviation 
models 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and * denotes significance at the 5% level
 
W matrices 
Land use model Poverty alleviation model 
Log-likelihood 
Ratio 
Marginal Effect  Log-likelihood 
Ratio 
Marginal Effect  
K nearest neighbor (KNN) 
K = 4 -651.970 0.030(0.014)* -616.441 -0.016(0.008)* 
K = 5 -651.864 0.029(0.014)* -616.625 -0.016(0.008)* 
K = 9 -650.665   0.028(0.014)   -616.681 -0.016(0.008)* 
K = 27 -652.339   0.028(0.015)       -616.154    -0.015(0.008) 
KNN * Inverse distance 
K = 4 -651.325 0.030(0.015)* -607.863 -0.018(0.007)* 
K = 5 -651.398 0.031(0.015)* -611.761 -0.021(0.008)* 
K = 9 -652.187 0.030(0.015)* -613.181 -0.021(0.008)* 
K = 27 -652.998 0.030(0.015)* -613.843 -0.020(0.008)* 
Inverse 
Distance 
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